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Abstract
This essay explores the success of the agenda set in the State of the Union and attempts to provide insight on
the factors that affect this success. Specifically, I will examine many factors on legislation which include: How
does the year in a President's term affect legislative success? How does control of government affect legislative
success? What role does partisanship play in the success of the agenda? After this analysis, I will evaluate the
presidential success scores reported by the CQ almanac in relationship with the success of the President's
agenda.
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Agenda Setting in the State ofthe Union
- The Impact on Legislative Success -
T.J. Wessel
Theory: Contemporary theories of presidential success factors on
legislation are used to examine the success rates of the president's
domestic agenda, which has been set in the State of the Union
address dating from the time of President Carter's address in 1978.
Hypotheses: First, I look at the effects of the balance of power in
Congress on legislative success. Second, I look at the effects of
percentage of party in office in Congress on legislative success.
Next, I look at the year in the President's term and how that affect
the legislation passed. Also, I look at the change in public opinion
polls of presidential approval ratings before and after the State of
the Union and its effects on legislation passed. Finally, I will
compare my agenda success rate with presidential success scores
as reported by the CQ almanac to examine the validity of the score.
Methods: I will employ a bivariate regression analysis of the
success of presidential agenda items stated in the State of the
Union in the Congressional Legislative year. The variables to be
tested will include: Length of presidential term in office, Balance
of Power in Congress, and Percentage of Seats held by the
President's party. The presidential agenda success score will also
be used to analyze the validity of the annual CQ presidential
success scores and vice versa.
Results: The effects of the variables on the legislative success of
the President's agenda in the State of the Union were not
overwhelmingly significant. Balance of Power in Congress
appeared to be the only variable with any statistical significance.
However the "honeymoon" theory of Presidential terms appears to
be disproved in relationship with agenda items. It appears that
outside factors not used within the research are the determining
factors upon legislative success of agenda items in the State ofthe
Union.
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The constitutional design of the United States government
requires coopcration and compromise betwecn Congress and the
Prcsident. However, latcly this relationship has becn marked by
circumstances that discouraged compromise. As many experts
havc put it, we havc been in an era of polarized politics. This leads
us to the question at hand - what role does the president's agenda
play in legislation? Also by constitutional design, the president is
required to address the entire government once a year thru the
State of the Union. This address has become a political stage for
thc Prcsidcnt. With the attention of the entire United States
governmcnt and the American society, the Prcsident uses the
addrcss to set his agenda for the upcoming Congressional year.
Little information exists on the success of this agenda and the
possible effccts of that success. This is particularly important
research for further knowledge on the relationship between the
President and the Congress, Partisan effects in Congress, and also
public opinion including ideas on how public opinion affects
public policy and the possible influence of presidential ideas on
public opinion.
This essay explores the success of the agenda set in the
State of the Union and attempts to provide insight on the factors
that affect this succcss. Specifically, I will examine many factors
on legislation which include: How does the year in a President's
term affcct legislative successo How does control of government
affect legislative success? What role does partisanship play in the
success of the agenda? After this analysis, I will evaluate the
presidential success scores reported by the CQ almanac in
relationship with the success of the President's agenda. Are the CQ
success scores valid in relationship with the "big ticket" agenda
items or is this merely a score based on partisan support for all
legislation? I will address these questions and attempt to answer
within this essay.
Previous Research
Given the increased importance of the State of the Union in
the late 20th century, it is particularly surprising that there has bcen
very little research on its effects upon lcgislation. Thc president
occupics the most prominent position in American politics. He or
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She has the unique ability to promote a national vision and to
influence actors both in the public and private sectors. In the 20th
century, the president's visibility in American politics has
increased with a growing role in domestic policy. With words and
images as well as the actions of the administration, the president
sets the terms of debate for the entire political system. Over the
years, presidents have used their "power of persuasion" the public
in its opinions. This has lead to an impOliant bartering tool with
members of Congress. However, the president doesn't always have
to speak out. The threat of "going public" is just as effective. The
State of the Union has evolved to become the most important event
in the President's public speaking schedule. It is the major event in
presidential leadership and congressional relations. When
presidents give the State of the Union address, they face a rare
assemblage of both houses of Congress, the Supreme Court, and
the Cabinet; the vice president and Speaker of the House are seated
behind the president, and a huge flag, the very symbol of
democracy itself, hangs in the background. All major television
networks cover the address thoroughly, halting regularly scheduled
programming to televise the event. The address covers the range
from domestic policy plans to foreign relations for the coming year.
Even if the designs are not yet completed, presidents announce
their agenda for the upcoming legislative year. Theorists have
noted that the setting of the speech is just as impOliant as the words
spoken and goals articulated. Very few spectators can remember
everything in the speech, but most can recall the memory of the
symbolic backdrop. The substance retained is usually restricted to
a few key phrases or ideas. Therefore, only the most important or
the priority policy is mentioned within the address (Presidents and
the Public, 1990). This is done to build momentum and obtain
agenda space in Congress.
At the core of every president's legislative strategy is
getting his or her agenda accepted and supported by Congress. If
presidents cannot focus the attention of Congress on his or her
priority policy, the policy will get lost in the legislative process.
Huntington (1973) asserted that "Scholars have maintained that the
President has the most significant role in setting the policy-making
agenda." Bond and Fleisher (1990) also found that "The
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president's greatest influence over policy making comes from the
agenda he pursues and the way it is packaged." The most
prominent work on the president and agendas is that of Paul Light
(1991), who examined the president's domestic agenda from the
Kennedy presidency to the Rcagan presidency. Light provides a
descriptive and qualitative study of thc agenda setting process.
Through this study, Light prescnts two theorctical ideas, the first of
which concerns how presidents develop goals of the agenda. Light
creates the idea ofthe "soup pot". The soup pot represents the
collection of policy input from media, the public, Congress (both
majority and minority parties), and most importantly advisors and
the presidcnt's self-ideology. From this collection the president
dcvelops personal policy, using ideas from all sectors and not
restricted in the policy formation. Light's second theoretical idea is
what actually forms the agenda from the ideas. Light states,
"Presidents must often sacrifice careful planning in the search for
legislative enactment .... Presidents must often have to choose
between reelection and good policy." Presidents often have to
move away from the best ideas or the ideas that best represent their
ideology for quick fixes. Our politicians are often judged on the
idea of "what have you done for me lately?" This is the dilemma
that faces all Presidents and their agendas. This study however
only centers on how the president's agenda is created and not the
role the president plays in getting that agenda set in Congress.
Mouw and Mackuen (1992) observed in their study that Presidents
set agendas that balance these two objectives: they try to "tailor the
policy content to have a chance to win," while reflecting the
prcsident's "preferences about the policy matter at hand."
It is also pertinent to analyze the working relationship
between the President and Congress. Covington, Wrighton, and
Kinney (1995) compared a Presidency augmented model of
presidential success with a traditional Congressional centered
model. The Congressional centered model is illustrated by the
following, "presidential success is detennined in large measure by
the results ofthe last election. If the last election brings individuals
to Congress whose local interests and preferences coincide with
the presidents, then he will enjoy greater success. If, on the other
hand, most members of Congress have preferences different from
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the president's, then he will suffer more defeats." This appears to
be a strictly patiisan view of presidential-congressional relations.
However, the Presidential augmented model makes two
modifications on the Congressional centered model. The model
recognizes the ability of the President to shape proposals
considered by Congress and that Party leaders can shape the ideas
of Congressmen to follow those of the President. The President can
affect legislation by "framing issues that favor his programs, the
president sets the terms of debate on his proposals and thus the
premises on which members of Congress cast their votes ...When a
President is successful in framing issues to his advantage, he has
won half the battle. He has established the premises or direction of
a policy or sets of policies." The authors examined these two
models by a means test of roll call voting. The results found no
support for either the Presidency augmented model or the
Congressional Centered model. However, the results did prove that
the President did have at least some effect on legislation. The
authors concluded that "we must go fmiher in our search for
measures of presidential involvement at the pre-floor stages of the
process, and the effects of their involvement in that process."
E.E. Schattschneider (1960) in The Semi-Sovereign People
produced a new theory on American politics. Schattschneider's
theory is based on the idea that all politics are a conflict between
two actors. The actor who has the most support will "win" the
conflict. Therefore, each actor's goal is either to expose the
conflict to bring more people to one side or to conceal and
internalize the conflict to keep the sides as they are. Simply put,
"He who has more friends wins." It can be seen that the State of
the Union exposes the conflict, which is the president's agenda,
and assists in bringing more friends - the American public on the
side of the president.
The President's increasing role in American politics is
reflected in, and magnified by, the American media. The State of
the Union just serves as one example. The media exhaustively
covers the address, with all news outlets predicting what the
President will cover, every major network televising the address,
and every newspaper and news outlet covering every last word of
what was said. This has become the major political event of the
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year. The media coverage has also been used to gain support from
the American public on certain policy areas and plans. Kernell and
Jacobson (1987) discovered evidence that suggests presidents have
enjoyed an advantage in press coverage over Congress throughout
the twentieth century. Edwards and Wood (1999) explored the
president's success in focusing the attention of Congress and the
mass media to targeted issues using a time-series measure of
presidential, congressional, and mass media attention. Their
findings discovered that, "in domestic policy, we find a more
interactive relationship, one that appears to offer the president the
opportunity to act in an entrepreneurial fashion to focus the
attention of others in the system on major presidential initiatives."
Edward Schneier (1969) supports this claim by stating "public
attitudes and opinions about issues under public discussion are also
conditioned by our knowledge of the opinions and behaviors of
other groups." The president must play the game of politics, a
game which is a game of skilL Much of this skill involves the
power of persuasion: the ability to mobilize public opinion, to
convince sympathetic policy-makers that they should act and
unsympathetic ones to change their minds. Presidents strive to
invoke the mindset of "if he's for it, I'm for it." All this leads to
the concept that public opinion is actually a dependent variable; it
takes the shape of the ideas of outside actors. The president plays a
leading role in shaping the ideals to be taken on by the American
public.
Research Design and Hypotheses
This exploratory project examines the Legislative success
rate in Congress of the Presidential agenda set in the State of the
Union and the extent to which it is associated with the length of
presidential term, balance of power in Congress, and the
percentage level at which the President's party controls Congress.
The data set contains the presidential terms fi'om Jimmy Carter
inl978 to the current George W. Bush term of 2004. The data was
collected by determining the agenda items established in the State
of the Union and assessed on the success of their passage in
Congress. These items were then analyzed to see if they were
signed into law during that Congressional year. A simple
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percentage equation will be used to create the Legislative success
score. The legislative score will be determined using the following
equation and a regression model will be run with the following
variables:
Legs suc= a+bl(maj con)+b2(% seat)+b3(LoT)
Three propositions will be examined in the following sections.
Balance ofPower
Hypothesis 1: The presidents with their party in control of
Congress will be more likely to experience legislative success in
the agenda set in the State of the Union.
This hypothesis will be tested using a nominal variable.
Zero (0) will represent having neither the House or Senate
controlled by the president's party, one (1) will represent having
either the House or Senate controlled by the president's party, and
two (2) will represent having both the House and Senate controlled
by the president's party. The House has sole power to set the
legislative agenda for the upcoming year; therefore having control
of Congress serves the President as a great power. Controlling the
Congress has traditionally meant that the President can take on
more ideological policies instead of having to appease the other
patty when they may have control of the Congress. Bond and
Fleisher (1990) acknowledge this power when they stated that,
"The president's party leaders typically assume the role of
administration lieutenants in Congress." These whips help rally the
vote counts for presidential policies, securing their passage through
both chambers and onto the President's desk. Sinclair (1997)
discovered similar findings "When the president and the
congressional majority are of the same party, greater partisanship
leads to greater presidential success."
Party Control ofCongress
Hypothesis 2: Presidents with their party holding a higher
percentage of Congressional seats will be more likely to
experience legislative success in the agenda stated in the State of
the Union.
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This hypothesis will be tested using an ordinal variable. I
will determine the percentage of members of Congress that is in
the president's party. The number of party membcrs will be
divided by 535, being that there is 435 seats in the House of
Representatives and 100 seats in the Senate; the number of
vaeancies will be subtraeted from the total. The hypothesis follows
common logic. The president is supposed to support and follow the
party policy plans, along with members of the same party.
However, when it eomes to constituents beliefs versus party poliey,
which way will the Representative choose? Taylor (1998) and
Edwards (1989) found that Congressional members are typically
apt to follow the president's lead. Kingdon (1989) diseovered that,
"Congressional members' voting patterns are shaped primarily by
constituency interests. Perhaps members are more supportive
beeause they have eonstitueneies that are more attuned to the
president's wishes than do other members."
Length ofterm
Hypothesis 3: Presidents who have served in office longer will be
less likely to experience legislative sueeess in the agenda stated in
the State of the Union.
This hypothesis will be tested using an ordinal variable.
The year in term will be designated simply by the year number in
the tenn. The first number that will be used will be 2 due to the
fact that the President does not give a State of the Union address in
his first year. In that first year, the President's agenda is laid out in
his inauguration speeeh. However this essay will only evaluate
State of the Union addresses and therefore the first year is left out.
A popular theory in contemporary Ameriean politieal seienee is
that of the Presidential Honeymoon. This idea is that the president
will experienee mueh more suecess in the earlier years of his tenn.
Right after an e1eetion, the president experiences a majority
support of the Ameriean publie, or at least an Eleetoral College
majority of support. Presidential nominees are usually given
support based on their poliey ideas. Therefore the norm is that
presidents eome into the office with a "running start" of support
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for his policy plans for the upcoming congressional year.
Conversely throughout his or her term, the president begins to lose
support and opposition policy ideas arise to the agenda. Kernell's
study (1978) found that "since popularity polls have been taken in
the mid-1930's, every president besides Eisenhower has left office
less popular than when he entered." Also, as the public popularity
for the president falls throughout the term, legislators are less
likely to support the president and his agenda in order to appeal to
their constituents' opinions. Edwards III and Barrett (2000) stated
that, "The President's advantage over Congress in the success of
his initiatives is restricted to unified government." This unification
ceases to exist as presidential support scores plummet.
Validity Check
CQ Almanac publishes yearly their Presidential Success
score. This score is based on the percentage of roll call votes won
that the president made a clear stand on. These votes can include
anything from budgetary items to domestic policy or even foreign
policy. This score will be analyzed along with the Presidential
agenda score to check the validity and the effects of non-agenda
items versus agenda items.
Discussion
Regression results for all independent variables while the
President's State of the Union Agenda served as the dependent
variable and can be found in Table 1.
Table 1: SOTU Agenda Regression
BoP
%
Seats
ViO
B
Value Beta
4.48 0.282
0.26 0.145
1.322 0.188
Significance
0.432
0.67
0.434
R square: .137
Contrary to original expectations, no hypotheses were
proven to be correct. Not only were none of the variables
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statistically significant, they were nowhere close to carry that
benchmark. However Balance of Power and Years in Office
appeared to hold a little more weight than that of Percentage of
Seats in Congress. Yet Years in Office was not negative as
predicted and hypothesized, possibly showing a trend that does not
follow many popular theories.
Due to these results, the same regression model was run but
CQ's Presidential success score was used as the dependent variable.
The results can be found in Table 2.
Table 2: CQ Presidential Success Regression
BoP
%
Seats
B
Value
10.724
0.231
Beta
0.601
0.115
Significance
0.007**
0.55
YiO -2.238 0.284 0.045*
R square: .726
* p<.05
**p<.Ol
When using this regression model, I found two variables to
be significant. Balance of Power followed the predicted hypothesis
and was significant to the.01 level. Years in office was significant
to the .05 level. Despite the fact that the previous equation using
State of the Union agenda found nothing significant, its
significance trends seem to follow the same trends as did the CQ
success score equation. Balance of Power in Congress appears to
hold the most effect of all variables. Years in Office also appears
to have a similar affect though it is in the opposite direction than
was hypothesized and that many theorists have discovered.
Percentage of Seats in Congress appears to not playa factor at all
in this analysis.
After finding these results, I decided to run the same
equations individually using the only two-term presidents studied
in this analysis, Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton. Table 3 below
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contains thc rcgrcssion results using the State of the Union Agenda
as the depcndent variable.
SignificanceBeta
Table 3: Reagan SOTU Agenda Regression
B
Value
BoP
%
Seats
YiQ
2.366
1.35
7.188
0.081
0.122
1
0.704
0.578
0.016'
R square: .899
*p<.05
Once again, Years in Officc was significant to thc .05 level
but in the opposite direction than was hypothesized. According to
these results, Reagan was more successful the longer he was in
office, disproving my hypothesis. The other two variables, Balance
of Power and Percentage of Seats controlled were nowhere close to
being significant. Below, in Table 4, is the regression model with
CQ's presidential scores of Reagan as the dcpendent variable.
Table 4: Reagan CQ Presidential Success Regression
B
Value Beta Significance
BoP
%
Seats
2.789
0.632
0.141
0.084
0.415
0.615
YiQ -4.387 0.893 0.011'
R square: .941
*p<.05
The results were similar in relation to the previous Reagan
equation. Once again, Years in Office was significant to the .05
level. Opposite of the previous equation, this variable did support
the hypothesis. This establishes that Reagan was more successful
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on overall roll call votes earlier in his term but was more
successful with agenda items later in his term.
Regression results for President Clinton, using his State of
the Union Agenda as the dependent variable are represented in
Table 5.
Table 5: Clinton SOTU Agenda Regression
-6.668 -3.55 0.683
2.869 0.755 0.728
BoP
%
Seats
YiO
B
Value
38.487
Beta
3.544
Significance
0.717
R square: .216
This equation has produced absolutely no significant
findings. No variable is even close to the threshold of being
statistically significant. Table 6 contains the regression results for
President Clinton using CQ's presidential success scores as the
dependent variable.
Table 6: Clinton CQ Presidential Success Regression
BoP
%
Seats
YiO
B Value Beta
135.839 6.212
-17.632 4.662
9.592 1.254
R square: .871
Significance
0.183
0.241
0.216
This equation confirms the previous equation's findings to
an extent. The variables are closer to being significant but are still
not significant to the .05 level. This equation shows that Balance of
Power held some weight during the Clinton term. One thing both
equations did prove was that neither followed the hypothesis that
Presidents will have more success in their earlier terms. Both failed
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to producc a ncgativc figurc which is rcquircd to prove this
relationship.
Conclusion
The results from this exploratory analysis of Presidential
Agenda setting in the State of the Union and its success suggests
that outside factors playa large role in the success or failure of
policies. The variables uscd in this analysis failed to fully identify
the influences of success opposed to those of failure. Balance of
Power in Congress was weakly proven by the research within this
analysis. This result is consistent with the previous literature and
conventional wisdom. Having power in Congress helps secure the
fact that the agenda items will be placed on the legislative agenda.
Most experts agree that most of the battle in domestic policy is
getting the policies on the agenda. The project rejected the idea
that party majority in Congress plays a role in policy acceptance.
This appears to disprove the idea of strict partisan voting by both
representatives and senators. These results appear to prove that
these individuals form their voting around their constituents' views
and opinions and that these are the factors that dominate roll call
voting patterns by Congressmen. One interesting finding by the
analysis was the disproval of the "Honeymoon theOly" in certain
circumstances. In the overall analysis of years in office using CQ's
presidential scores as the dependent variable, this theory appears to
hold true. However, when using the President's agenda in the State
of the Union, the opposite effect is seen. Thc presidents appear to
have more sucecss the longer that they are in office. These findings
seem to support some new ideas. Agenda items are usually new
ideas or very complex and complicated policies. It appears to take
many ycars to assure the policies' acceptance by all members and
passage through legislation. Also, when first elected, the President
entcrs not only with his new policies, but the policies of all 435
representatives that were just elected orre-elected and the 33 or 34
senators that were elected or re-elected as well. It takes time to
decipher between all of the ideas and policies in order to crcate a
cumulative and all-encompassing policy.
Future research should begin by reconstructing the modcl
presented here and examining other potential direct, interactive, or
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intervening variables in an attempt to capture all factors of
legislative success. In particular, future research should take into
account the influences of public opinion, media coverage of
agenda items, and interest group activity and influence on policy.
Time spent on legislation should be another factor to be taken into
consideration. It is apparent that drafting and considering
legislation is a time-consuming procedure. Some congressional
legislative years are controlled by domestic dilelmnas while others
are dominated by foreign dilelmnas. This controlling force appears
to be a factor that could greatly affect the legislation passed.
Overall, one factor appears to be controlling the procedure that was
not taken into consideration; simply put, it may be the policy itself.
Many times the president mentions the same policy issues year
after year in the State of the Union and every year they will not be
passed. By the information found in this analysis and the literature
analyzed for this essay, policy is the main factor that controls how
a Congressman votes. If it is a good policy that his/her constituents
support, the vote cast will be yes. If it is a bad policy that his/her
constituents would not support, the vote will be no. Analysis of
this concept would not only improve the understanding of agenda
voting, but it may serve as a step forward in understanding
bicameral relations.
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Appendix 1
Data Table
Agenda %
Year percent COsuc BoP Seats YiO
1978 71.4 78.3 2 65.3 2
1979 42.9 76.8 2 62.5 3
1980 50 75.1 2 62.4 4
1981
1982 16.7 72.4 0 44.8 2
1983 25 67.1 1 41.2 3
1984 25 65.8 1 41.7 4
1985 40 59.9 1 44 5
1986 50 56.1 1 43.7 6
1987 57.1 43.5 0 41.8 7
1988 50 47.4 0 41.9 8
1989
1990 50 46.8 0 41.3 2
1991 45.5 54.2 0 39.1 3
1992 33.3 43 0 39.2 4
1993
1994 22.2 86.4 2 58.1 2
1995 22.2 36.2 0 45.6 3
1996 43.8 55.1 0 45.9 4
1997 35.7 53.6 0 46.7 5
1998 25 51 0 46.7 6
1999 25 37.8 0 48 7
2000 33.3 55 0 47.7 8
2001
2002 41.7 88 1 51.7 2
2003 55.6 78.7 2 52.6 3
2004 41.9 72.6 2 52.2 4
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